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Shareholders' legal rights to participate in corporate governance are
often said to constitute "corporate democracy." But the core values of
corporate governance are undemocratic in two ways. First, corporate
governance allocates power among shareholders based on the dollars they
have invested, not on their status as persons. Second, and moreover, it
disenfranchises other stakeholders-such as employees, neighbors, and
customers-unless they have the means and inclination to buy shares.
There are of course many economic reasons for allocating corporate
control in this way. The "undemocratic" nature of corporate governance
does not necessarily make the existing governance regime illegitimate. But
it does show that "corporate democracy" is a misleading metaphor. While
economic efficiency and property-rights arguments may provide
justifications for the corporate governance regime, democratic theories do
not.
After some seventy years, most corporate law academics have come to
agree with Berle and Means' famous descriptive argument that corporate
decisionmaking power is denied to shareholders and is instead heavily
concentrated in the board of directors and upper management.' As with most
t This comment responds to the draft version of the Article as presented at the
Symposium. The final version of the Article, as revised, appears in this volume at 63 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 1503 (2006).
* Professor, University of California, Davis, School of Law (Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr., Hall). This paper was prepared for and presented at the "Understanding Corporate Law
Through History" conference held at Washington and Lee University School of Law in March
2006. I thank Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, Lyman Johnson, David Millon, and all the participants in
the conference for a stimulating discussion. I would also like to thank U.C. Davis School of
Law and Dean Rex Perschbacher for research support.
I. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 4-5 (1932); see also, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing
Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REv. 833, 836 (2005) ("A central and well-settled principle
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issues in corporate law academia, the normative discourse about this
concentration of power consists mainly of debating whether this arrangement is
"feconomically efficient." That is, "corporate democracy" is both descriptively
inaccurate and normatively marginalized. Outside the ivory tower, however,
the law continues to use the concept both descriptively and normatively. The
Delaware Supreme Court, for example, has invoked the term in a number of
prominent cases.2 The United States Supreme Court has treated some corporate
political spending as protected political speech on the theory that such spending
is the product of "the procedures of corporate democracy. 3 Many reformers
who disagree with this rosy descriptive view call for increased shareholder
power in order to make corporate governance more "democratic. 4
Dalia Tsuk Mitchell's contribution to this Symposium, Shareholders as
Proxies: The Contours of Shareholder Democracy,5 is an intellectual history of
the changing views of regulators, reformers and scholars as to the meaning of
"corporate democracy." Tsuk Mitchell identifies three theories that reformers
have invoked to justify increased shareholder participation in corporate
governance. These theories make varying assumptions about the relationship
of U.S. corporate law is that all major corporate decisions must be initiated by the board.");
Stephen A. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARv. L
REv. 1735, 1735 (2006) ("I do not quibble with Bebchuk's exposition of shareholder weakness;
to the contrary, I welcome it as further evidence that my director primacy model accurately
describes how corporations work.").
2. See, e.g., Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1381 (Del. 1996) ("[T]he stockholders
control their own destiny through informed voting. This is the highest and best form of
corporate democracy."); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) ("The machinery of
corporate democracy and the derivative suit are potent tools to redress the conduct of a torpid or
unfaithful management."); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946,959 (Del. 1985) ("If
the stockholders are displeased with the action of their elected representatives, the powers of
corporate democracy are at their disposal to turn the board out.").
3. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978).
4. For example, after unsuccessful attempts to place shareholder proposals on corporate
proxies, AFSCME released a white paper on proxy reform titled Shareholder Access to the
Proxy: Increasing Democracy and Accountability in Corporate Governance, http://www.sri
advocacy.org/reports/proxyaccess.pdf (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
The SEC took no action on the corporations' exclusions of the proposals but announced it
would consider reforming proxy regulation "to improve corporate democracy." SEC Press
Release, Apr. 13, 2003, http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-46.htm (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). This led to a proposal, ultimately rejected, to allow
shareholders to place their nominees for the board on the corporate proxy. See Thomas W. Joo,
Corporate Hierarchy and Racial Justice, 79 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 955, 961 (2005).
5. Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, Shareholders as Proxies: The Contours of Shareholder
Democracy, at 1 [hereinafter Tsuk Mitchell, Symposium Draft Version] (Symposium:
Understanding Corporate Law Through History, Draft Version, 2006) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
1580
COMMENT: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & THE "D-WORD"
between corporations' role in society (in Tsuk Mitchell's terminology,
"corporate power") and the allocation of control rights between shareholders
and management ("corporate hierarchy"). First, Tsuk Mitchell argues,
Progressive Era reformers believed that reforming hierarchy to increase
shareholder participation would enable shareholders to tame corporate power
for the benefit of society.6 Second, Tsuk Mitchell contends that the primary
concern, from the New Deal Era through the 1970s, was protecting the rights of
the individual shareholder against potential abuses of power by management.7
Third, neoclassical economists since the 1970s have argued that shareholder
participation empowers shareholders to "shape their own economic (and
political) destinies."8 In sum, she argues, the focus of analysis has shifted from
corporate power in society to internal corporate hierarchies to the market.9
Although I have a different view of the Progressives' approach, I
otherwise agree with Tsuk Mitchell's insightful intellectual history. In this
Comment, I would like to expand upon the normative implications of her
account. After the Progressive Era, as Tsuk Mitchell argues, the corporate
problem was redefined as corporate hierarchy rather than corporate power.1°
The focus on this problem, and the ostensible solutions to it, played an
important role in legitimating corporate power by portraying it as the result of a
"democratic" process. Today, the neoclassical economic model assumes that all
outcomes are the voluntary result of market mechanisms. I agree with Tsuk
Mitchell's conclusion that the law has come to see the market as "democracy's
sustaining and legitimating force."" Most corporate law academics, however,
have been relatively frank about their narrow focus on "efficiency" and their
lack of interest in "democracy" as a normative value. To the extent that the
nonacademic discourse about corporations remains interested in democracy,
academics' efficiency-minded analyses of corporate governance have limited
relevance. Policymakers and corporate reformers must resist the temptation to
conflate "democracy" with either that old favorite, shareholder power, or the
current academic darling, the market.
6. See id. at 5 ("Progressives were concerned about potential abuses of corporate power
and how the rapid separation of ownership from control augmented these potential abuses.").
7. See id. at 6 ("[C]oncerns about corporate power in society... were replaced by
concerns about the relationship between management and individual shareholders.").
8. Id.
9. See id. at 39 (noting the change in the analysis over time).
10. See Tsuk Mitchell, Symposium Draft Version, supra note 5, at 31-33 (contrasting the
theories of Douglas with those of Ripley and Berle).
11. Id. at 55.
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In the late 1800s and early 1900s, the "corporations problem" was the
emerging potential of large businesses to affect social conditions such as prices
and wages, primarily through the formation of trusts. Tsuk Mitchell argues that
the Progressives sought to enlist shareholders to restrain management and
controlling shareholders from using corporate power in this way.' 2 According
to Tsuk Mitchell, the Progressives "assumed that by imposing mandatory
disclosure rules on corporations.., they would protect not only the market but
also the shareholders as a group from the threat of monopoly .... 1113
This is my only point of descriptive disagreement with Professor Tsuk
Mitchell. I do not believe that "disclosure" in the Progressive era was intended
to empower shareholders to exercise participatory powers of voting or selling,
whether for their own protection or for the benefit of society. In fact, the
Progressives seem to have viewed shareholders as part of the problem of
excessive corporate power, not the solution. While information asymmetries
and power conflicts within the firm were acknowledged, of course, they were
not the central theoretical or policy concern at that time.14 Progressives wanted
disclosure because they believed it would create accountability, not to
shareholders, but to "the public." That is, the information was for consumption
outside the firm, not within it. It was intended to inform regulators, deter legal
violations, and warn would-be public investors of bad investments. Rather than
the "management vs. shareholder" trope we are familiar with today, the
fundamental dichotomy of the day was "corporation vs. society." "Corporation"
included management as well as financiers and shareholders, and "society"
included the government, consumers and the relatively new phenomenon of the
middle-class individual who was considering investing his money in
securities.1 5
12. See id. at 5 ("[T]he 1920s reformers emphasized the role that minority shareholders as
a group could play in preventing the control group from dominating the corporate decision-
making process.")
13. Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
14. It is true that Dodge v. Ford, for example, recognized internal power conflicts when it
famously opined that management's duty is to the shareholder. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170
N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). But Dodge's real import is its statement of business-judgment-
rule deference: The strong presumption that fiduciary principles and management expertise
align management actions with shareholder interests. Id. at 681-82. That is, upon recognizing
the hierarchy issue, the court resolved it by assuming it away.
15. Contemporary economic theory sees little difference between the two. But, as will be
argued, the Progressives focused specifically on the investor as "outside" the corporation.
While purist adherents of the "nexus of contracts" model of the firm may argue that the firm has
no "outside" or "inside," that theory was not available until the 1970s. See William W. Bratton,
Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 407,
407-10 (1989) (discussing the history of the "nexus of contracts" theory).
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The primary examples of "mandatory disclosure" Tsuk Mitchell cites are
the Bureau of Corporations, established by President Theodore Roosevelt to
gather information on trust activity, 6 and Louis Brandeis's argument for
increased disclosures in Other People's Money. 17  Modem disclosure
philosophy aims to enable individuals to express their preferences (whatever
they may be) through market mechanisms. The stated purpose of"disclosure"
under the Bureau of Corporations scheme, however, was to further a specific,
government-determined macroeconomic policy: curtailing anticompetitive
activity. As Robert Rabin has argued, Roosevelt believed in active federal
regulation of big business for the benefit of society, which necessitated
"governmental monitoring of large-scale enterprise ... ."18 According to
Rabin, "[t]he embodiment of Roosevelt's regulatory philosophy was the Bureau
of Corporations, established in 1903 for the purpose of collecting industrial
data and investigating corporate trade practices as a deterrent against illicit
corporate activities."'9  That is, the Bureau required a corporation's
"disclosure" not to empower or protect that corporation's shareholders, but to
discourage the corporation from anticompetitive activity-activity that could
have enriched its shareholders. It was society (broadly defined), not
shareholders, that needed protection from corporations and their actions.
In Other People's Money, Brandeis's notion of "disclosure" explicitly
meant providing information to investors. 20 But Brandeis's view of investors in
the market vis 6 vis corporate issuers was like Theodore Roosevelt's view of the
public vis t vis trusts: as consumers in danger of exploitation by corporations.
His concern was the collusion of issuers and investment banks in selling
overvalued stock to the public. 2' Thus, Brandeis wanted investment banks to
disclose their underwriting profits. He argued that if prospective investors
knew the extent to which the offering price was inflated by the underwriters'
16. See infra note 23 and accompanying text (describing the purpose and function of the
Bureau of Corporations).
17. See LouIs BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY: AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 62-73
(Richard M. Abrams ed., Harper Torchbooks 1967) (1914) (positing increased publicity as a
remedy to corporate malfeasance).
18. Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REv.
1189, 1218 (1986) (emphasis added).
19. Id. at 1219 (emphasis added).
20. See BRANDEIS, supra note 17, at 69-73 (arguing for disclosure as a solution to
corporate problems).
21. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 41-42 (3d ed. 2003)
("Brandeis... viewed the need to reform securities sales procedures primarily as stemming
from the self-interest of investment bankers.").
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22markup, they could make better investment decisions. As with the Bureau of
Corporations, the proposed method did not involve shareholder empowerment.
Indeed, as with the Bureau, corporate disclosure would give the power of
information to nonshareholders, potentially at the expense of the corporation
and its shareholders: Brandeis noted with approval that when British investors
believed underwriting markups had gotten out of hand, they engaged in a
"capital strike" and refused to purchase new corporate bonds.23
As Tsuk Mitchell observes, the "corporations problem" was conceived
differently by the 193 Os. 24  Theorists and policymakers began a formal
analytical dissection of the corporation as an institution. 25 Corporate theory
was, and remains, profoundly affected by this "disaggregation" approach. The
immediate question was no longer the role of the corporation as a component of
society, but the roles of shareholders and management as components of the
corporation. In the decades that followed, reforms of corporate hierarchy
tinkered with the balance between shareholder participation and managerial
prerogative.
How did the new understanding of the disaggregated, conflicted
corporation affect the old question of corporate power? The "corporate
hierarchy" issue soon came to overshadow the larger "corporate power" issue.
In the Progressive era, the government had been the regulator of corporations.
Thus the fundamental American notions of a democratically legitimate
government played a key role in legitimating the role of corporations in society.
But even as giant corporations amassed more state-like powers, the government
backed further and further away from attempting to control them. Although the
New Deal is often caricatured as statist, it is probably better understood as
embodying "corporate liberalism": cooperation among government, business,
and other institutions as constitutive units of liberal society.26 The Securities
22. See BRANDEIS, supra note 17, at 69-73 (arguing for disclosure as a solution to
corporate problems).
23. Id. at 68-69.
24. For an. analysis of changing views of corporations during the 1930s, see Tsuk
Mitchell, Symposium Draft Version, supra note 5, at 25-34.
25. See, e.g., BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 4 (describing the "separation of ownership
and control").
26. Ellis W. Hawley, The Discovery and Study of a "Corporate Liberalism," 52 Bus.
HIsT. RPv. 309, 311-14 (1978). While elements of corporate liberalism survive, Tsuk Mitchell
has elsewhere convincingly argued that due to libertarian ideological developments and the
failure of the National Recovery Administration (NRA), corporate liberalism gave way to
today's even more individualistic view of corporations and their shareholders. Dalia Tsuk,
From Pluralism to Individualism: Berle and Means and 20th Century American Legal
Thought, 30 LAw & Soc. INQuIRY 179, 189-94 (2005).
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Exchange Act, for example, recognized the stock exchanges as "self-regulatory
organizations" collaborating with the SEC to make economic policy.
27
This shift from an adversarial to a cooperative relationship with
corporations likely resulted not just from the political muscle of business, but
also from deeper anti-totalitarian and anti-communist ideological concerns. But
as corporations became more self-regulating, the legitimacy of government
could no longer suffice to explain the legitimacy of the corporate role.
Corporations themselves needed legitimation. Berle and Means had robbed
libertarian property theory of some of its ability to justify corporate power:
They argued that corporations were not controlled by their "owners" and were
thus fundamentally different from private property.28 Moreover, a justification
of corporate power based solely on private-property grounds might sound
uncomfortably like an apology for plutocracy-a potential liability for
capitalism as global ideological battles heated up. The Cold War also limited
the appeal of a technocratic explanation (i.e., the business acumen of
professional managers), as its inherent elitism failed to distinguish capitalism
from totalitarianism. 29 Corporate power, then, came to require not merely a
justification, but a democratic justification.
The SEC rule requiring corporations to include shareholder proposals in
proxy solicitations, now known as Rule 14a-8, symbolically addresses this
need. Tsuk Mitchell is ambivalent, and rightly so, about the rule's actual value
in empowering shareholders. 30 But her dramatic telling of the contraction of
the Rule's scope implicitly overstates the original Rule's impact on shareholder
participation. Since 1943, the Rule has applied only to proposals that involve
"a proper subject for action by the security holders."''0 As Tsuk Mitchell notes,
the SEC has vacillated as to whether this includes proposals relating to
"'political, racial, religious, social or similar causes.' 32 But whatever the
27. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78(c) (2000).
28. BERLE&MEANS, supra note 1, at 69-118.
29. Cf. Tsuk, supra note 26, at 182 ("[I]ncreasing apprehension about the politically
contagious European totalitarianism turned scholarly attention to individual rights.").
30. See Tsuk Mitchell, Symposium Draft Version, supra note 5, at 48 ("[T]he SEC
amended the rule 14A-8 to open the door, albeit not widely, for social purpose shareholder
proposals.").
31. SEC Rule X-14-A-7, Duty of Management to Set Forth Stockholder's Proposals,
Securities Act Release No. 2887, Exchange Act Release No. 3347, Investment Company Act
Release No. 417, 1942 WL 34864 (Dec. 18, 1942). The SEC had required corporations to
include shareholder proposals on the proxy since 1938, but the "proper subject" limitation did
not go into effect until 1943. David C. Bayne, The Basic Rationale ofProper Subject, 34 U.
DET. MERCY L. REv. 575,590-92 (1957). The current version of the Rule is SEC Rule 14a-
8(i)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1).
32. Tsuk Mitchell, Symposium Draft Version, supra note 5, at 48 (quoting Phillip A.
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substantive content of proposals, the "proper subject" provision has long been
limited primarily to nonbinding shareholder proposals, on the theory that state
law does not empower shareholders to manage the corporation directly.33
Focusing on the Rule's failure to empower shareholders also understates
the impact of 14a-8 on the legitimation of corporate conduct. 34 "Shareholder
democracy" is "mythical" in two senses. First, it is a falsehood. Second, and
more importantly, it is a comforting tale that, despite its falsity, appeals to our
preexisting beliefs and ideologies to help us to rationalize the status quo.35
Shareholder voting bears a superficial resemblance to political elections, the
civic rituals that symbolize our political democracy. While the term
"shareholder democracy" can be used narrowly to refer to this surface
similarity, the usage cannot be severed from its deeper connotations.
Furthermore, rhetorical emphasis on the importance of shareholder voting
implicitly equates it with political voting. Thus the institution of shareholder
voting and the rhetoric of "corporate democracy" or "shareholder democracy"
feed upon all our beliefs about democracy as the legitimator of our political
system.36 These legitimating connotations were of course very potent during
the Cold War Era, and have renewed resonance in post-9/1 1 America.
Nicholas, Jr., The Securities and Exchange Commission and the Shareholder Proposal Rule:
Agency, Administration, Corporate Influence, and Shareholder Power, 1942-1988, at 67-81
(2002) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, State University of New York at Albany) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review)).
33. Louis Loss, 2 SECURITIES REGULATION 906-08 (2d ed. 1961). The current rule is
followed by a "Note" advising shareholders that the SEC is more likely to approve proposals
that are "cast as recommendations or requests that the board of directors take specified action."
17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8, Note to Paragraph (i)(1) (2006). Similar language has appeared in the rule
since 1976. Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, 4 SECURITIEs REGULATION 2006 (3d ed. 1990). As
Loss and Seligman observe, the extent to which state law prohibits binding shareholder
proposals is not entirely clear. Id. at 2007-11. In any case, shareholder power to affect
governance through proposals is limited, whether that limitation is imposed by state or federal
law.
34. Cf Loss, 2 SECURrIEs REGULATION, supra note 33, at 911 ("[O]ne should not
underestimate [the rule's] symbolic significance in an area in which no alternative philosophy
has yet been developed for the classic theory of managerial responsibility to the owners for the
business.").
35. Cf Donald Langevoort, Rereading Cady Roberts, 99 COLuM. L. REv. 1319, 1328-29
(1999) (arguing that insider trading regulation is legitimated by the myth that it increases
investor confidence in the securities markets). This sense of "myth" is famously articulated in
ROLAND BARTHES, Myth Today, in MYTHOLOGIES (Annette Lavers trans., 1972).
36. Cf Thomas W. Joo, Contract, Property, and the Role of Metaphor in Corporations
Law, 35 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 779, 789-804 (2002) (arguing that the contract metaphor for
corporations, although based on the economic idea of contracts as market transactions, also
feeds upon the legal meaning of "contract" as an enforceable obligation). As for whether our
beliefs about our political "democracy" are themselves myths, I leave that for another day.
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The legitimating power of "shareholder democracy" is undeserved.
Adjustments in the balance of power between shareholders and management
seek to bring corporate governance into conformity with its own professed
aspirations about governance. But those aspirations are hardly "democratic."
Our political "democracy" purports to be "government of the people, by the
people, for the people," 37 and gains legitimacy from that description. Of course
significant debate exists over the precise meaning of "democracy"-for
example, whether it requires only procedural equality of opportunity to
participate or some degree of substantive equality of outcome as well. The
vague and contested nature of the term underscores the fact that the term
"democracy" in the corporate context is more useful as a legitimating myth than
as an illuminating description.
But whatever the precise meaning of the term, "shareholder democracy"
aspires only to corporate decisionmaking by shareholders and not to the control
of society by its people. This narrow aspiration is clear from its internal
allocation of control rights and, moreover, from its external denial of control
rights. As Colleen Dunlavy's contribution to this Symposium points out,
modem shareholder voting is allocated on the basis of shares owned.3 8
Corporate governance in the age of the public corporation does not even aspire
to the democratic ideal of "one person, one vote." The highest aspiration of
contemporary reform is "one share, one vote." At best, this only
metaphorically resembles "one person, one vote," under a metaphor that
substitutes a share-an economic commodity-for a person. As Dunlavy
points out, one-vote-per-shareholder voting regimes once were common in the
United States. 39 While the one-vote-per-share principle is property-based, or, to
use Dunlavy's term, "plutocratic," a per-capita voting allocation would not
necessarily transform corporate governance into a democratic institution.
Because shareholder voting power is limited in scope and weak in practice,
reallocating votes on a per-capita basis would not by itself give shareholders as
individuals control over corporations.
Moreover, the one-vote-per-share principle is "plutocratic" not only
because of how it allocates (limited) participation rights among shareholders
but because it allocates participation rights only among shareholders.
Shareholder voting, whether allocated per share or per capita, disenfranchises
those who do not own shares, particularly those who lack the money to invest.
37. President Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863).
38. Colleen A. Dunlavy, Social Conceptions of the Corporation Insights from the History
of Shareholder Voting Rights, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1347, 1348-49 (2007).
39. Id. at 1354-55.
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Thus shareholder control gives shareholders power to make decisions that
affect the corporation's nonshareholder constituents (workers, consumers,
society broadly) while denying those constituents any participatory role.4°
Since shareholders have financial interests in the corporation that the other
constituents do not, shareholders have incentive to use their voting power to
enrich themselves at the expense of other constituents.
Tsuk Mitchell retells the dramatic story of James Peck, co-founder of the
Congress of Racial Equality.41 As a shareholder of Greyhound Corporation,
Peck attempted to use the federal shareholder proposal rule to advance a
resolution against segregated bus seating. The SEC advised Greyhound in
1951 that it need not allow shareholders to use the proposal rule for "political"
issues and codified this position in a 1952 amendment to the rule. Tsuk
Mitchell criticizes the SEC for choosing management over shareholders in this
internal dispute and, moreover, for framing the Greyhound issue as one of
corporate hierarchy instead of corporate power. "The alternative of focusing on
corporate power," she argues, "would have required Greyhound to include
Peck's proposal in its proxy solicitation. 4 2 But requiring Greyhound to include
the proposal would have expressed no position as to whether segregation was
an abuse of corporate power. Such a requirement would have merely regulated
the procedure by which the shareholders and management determined whether
African Americans deserved an equal place in society. Would "democracy"
have been satisfied, and corporate power addressed, if the desegregation
proposal had gone before the shareholders and they had voted it down? The
real "undemocratic" problem with the Greyhound affair was hardly the
privileging of management over shareholders; it was the privileging of
corporate self-governance over black civil rights.43 This was a problem that
could not be solved, or even addressed, by empowering shareholders, a class
that was (and is) primarily wealthy and white.
40. Consider past versions of "democracy" that we now see as having been inadequate:
"one man, one vote;" one propertied free white man, one vote; one white person one vote.
Referring to one-vote-per-share as "democracy" evidences a similar failure of imagination and
lack of respect for the individual.
41. Tsuk Mitchell, Symposium Draft Version, supra note 5, at 40.
42. Id.
43. Actually ordering the desegregation of buses would, of course, have been beyond the
power of the SEC but not beyond the power of Congress (although that was admittedly a
contentious issue at the time). The SEC's limited mandate suggests that its authority only
touches a corporation's hierarchy and can do nothing significant about a corporation's power.
In any event, the question is whether the government's response to Greyhound's segregation
would address power or merely hierarchy, not whether it would have been within the
government's constitutional power at the time.
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My purpose here is not to quarrel with Tsuk Mitchell, who herself has
argued elsewhere that shareholder-centrism allows corporate power to grow
without social accountability.44 The point, rather, is to underscore the
misleading nature of "democracy" rhetoric in the corporate governance context.
Both the internal allocation of votes and the external denial of votes grant
status based on wealth, not personhood. The cognitive failure lies in thinking
of the corporation as a miniature polity, of which only shareholders are
members with the moral right to vote. But "democracy" is not satisfied by
parochial self-determination of institutions that affect society if they are free
from democratic accountability to society.
I am not advocating the nationalization of industry. My point is that the
uncritical equation of shareholder voting with "democracy" ignores the obvious
and fundamental tension between communitarian and libertarian values in a
capitalist democracy. Shareholder control has plenty of reasonable
justifications, such as categorical property rights theories, or consequentialist
theories about incentivizing the efficient generation of wealth. Appealing as
these values may be though, they are not necessarily the same as "democracy."
It is often argued that private property rights and free markets are prerequisites
to democracy. But property and markets are normative values distinct from
democracy. Even if these values are prerequisites, it is far from settled how far
they reach and how inviolable they should be. In short, the "democratic"
legitimacy of corporate governance does not follow directly from shareholder
voting rights, however extensive. Such a conclusion depends upon contested
assumptions about the nature of democracy and its relationship to property
rights and markets.
As the Greyhound example shows, the inward and proceduralist focus of
corporate governance threatened to obscure the issue of corporate power. The
neoclassical economic theory of the firm, also known as the "contractarian," or
"nexus of contracts," model, took corporate disaggregation to its extreme,
turning it back upon itself to reunify the hierarchy and power inquiries. While
Progressivism and corporate liberalism had relied on elitist technocrats to
coordinate activity for the maximization of welfare, Neoclassicism relied upon
the "natural" force of the Market. Under this view, it is not management's
superior skill, knowledge or honor that binds it to shareholders. Rather, it is the
naked self-interest of management that forces it to serve the naked self-interest
of shareholders. These anti-elitist views accorded nicely with the loss of faith
in government and democratic institutions in post-Watergate, post-Vietnam
America. Technocratic centralization has been replaced by the neoclassical
44. For this argument, see Tsuk, supra note 26, at 184-85.
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belief that social welfare is best optimized by maximizing aggregate individual
utility, as measured by idiosyncratic individual preferences that are
"exogenous" and immune to normative analysis.
Thus, as Tsuk Mitchell argues, corporate governance has come to focus on
"freeing" shareholders to engage in self-determination.45 A nice irony is that
under this model, as in the Progressive conception, the shareholder and the
corporation are once again teamed up against the state. Social welfare,
however, no longer depends upon the state taming the corporation and its
greedy shareholders, but on the corporation and its shareholders taming the
smothering state.
The neoclassical approach adopts a totalizing marketism: Corporations
and other institutions are not distinct from the market; they are nothing but
rhetorical shorthand for sets of market transactions. This addresses the
"externality" problem discussed above, for if there is no firm, no one is outside
the firm. Everyone is "inside" the market: Control rights are allocated among
all potential claimants by market principles. The participatory rights of
shareholders reflect their bargained-for balance between power and low share
prices. The limited participatory rights of workers reflect their tradeoff between
power and high wages and benefits. Nonshareholder constituencies have
chosen not to become participatory shareholders and, further, have failed in the
political marketplace to obtain government regulation. Furthermore, marketism
holds that self-interested bargains among individuals result by definition in the
optimal allocation of resources across society. Thus the neoclassical model
unifies the hierarchy and power inquiries: The allocation of corporate control
rights, by its very nature as a market outcome, maximizes social welfare.
On the one hand, this model may appear to answer the "antidemocratic"
accusations raised above. To the extent that managers enjoy control, they have
not seized it. Corporate constituents (and not just shareholders) have bargained
it away. But even assuming for the moment that market transactions are not
coercive and that they are equally--or more-economically efficient than
participatory, deliberative decisionmaking, 46 that does not make a transaction-
based regime "democratic." Vote-selling, for example, is generally considered
counter to democratic values. Some political values may be categorically
immune to commodification. Moreover, even if the neoclassical model is
correct in its predictions about economic efficiency, the outcome of market
procedures is not necessarily the same as the outcome of a democratic process.
45. Tsuk Mitchell, Symposium Draft Version, supra note 5, at 33, 55.
46. For this assumption, see id., at 46, quoting Henry G. Manne, Some Theoretical
Aspects of Shareholder Voting, 64 COLuM. L. REv. 1427, 1444 (1964).
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That is, deliberation and participation may change opinions and yield different
results than commodification and market transactions would. Finally, by
defining market outcomes as fair outcomes, the neoclassical model conflates
"liberty" (that is, economic deregulation) with "democracy." That conflation
allows it to avoid the fundamental question of whether "democracy" requires
some measure of substantive equality in addition to procedural equality.
Now of course, none of the foregoing critique by itself establishes that the
corporate governance regime is "illegitimate." Most corporate law academics
of the law-and-economics stripe (that is, most corporate law academics) do not
claim that corporate legitimacy rests on "democratic" values. They may debate
whether control rights should vest in management or shareholders, but frankly
commit to use the consequentialist yardstick of"efficiency," expressed in terms
of high share prices, to evaluate corporate governance.47 As noted above,
however, corporate doctrine, as expounded by the courts, regularly invokes
"democracy" as a legitimating myth. As Tsuk Mitchell notes, the Delaware
Supreme Court has stated that shareholder voting is a special institution
because it is crucial to legitimating the corporate governance system--even ifit
is merely an empty, "unimportant formalism. ' 48  This startlingly frank
assessment seems to imply that the law must protect the safeguard of the
legitimacy of management power over shareholders (and by extension
management's choices about the use of corporate power in society) by whatever
means necessary, including manipulating the legitimating power of
"democratic" myths.
I beg to differ. Corporate legitimacy may be based on many alternative
foundations, and public discourse should be more frank and explicit about what
those bases are. If shareholder voting, proposals, and other trappings of
"shareholder democracy" amount to nothing but "unimportant formalism,"
eliminating them makes more sense than continuing to exploit their legitimating
power. Director elections and shareholder proposals only rarely enable
47. For example, Lucian Bebchuk and Stephen Bainbridge disagree over whether
increased shareholder power will increase firm value but agree that firm value is the relevant
metric. Compare Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARv.
L. REv. 833 (2005), with Stephen A. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder
Disempowerment, 119 HARv. L. REv. 1735 (2006). Bainbridge subscribes to Kenneth Arrow's
view that large businesses cannot be run efficiently without centralized "authoritative control."
Id. at 1749. Bebchuk argues that shareholder power will make corporations more efficient at
wealth creation. Bebchuk, supra, at 842 ("I do not view increasing shareholder power as an end
in and of itself.").
48. See Tsuk Mitchell, Symposium Draft Version, supra note 5, at 55 (noting how this
formalism serves a legitimating purpose) (quoting Blasius Indust., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d
651, 659 (1988)).
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shareholders to affect corporate policy. Their far greater significance lies in the
false "democratic" aura they give to all exercises of "corporate" power-a
power that is in fact almost always wielded unilaterally by management.
Eliminating nominally "participatory" rituals would squelch the confounding
myth of corporate democracy and show that modem corporate power, if it is
legitimate at all, must legitimate itself on the basis of its social utility. The
discourse about the extent of corporate regulation could then explicitly weigh
the material benefits (and costs) of the modem corporation against categorical
"democratic" values like accountability and public participation. A frank focus
on efficiency justifications might also facilitate a more serious critical
assessment of Neoclassicism's often unquestioned claims about corporate
efficiency.49
I doubt my immodest proposal will get very far. Like the courts, many
nonacademic shareholder activists wave the flag of"corporate democracy." But
they should be aware that, in exchange for incremental control rights, they are
indirectly participating in the mythmaking that legitimates both corporate
hierarchy and corporate power. At the very least, courts and reformers should
be wary of the careless application-and deliberate manipulation-of the forms
and terminology of "corporate democracy" and "shareholder democracy."
49. The neoclassical market model, like "corporate democracy," can itself be seen as a
myth that legitimates corporate hierarchy and power. Patrick J. Ryan, Rule 14a-8, Institutional
Shareholder Proposals, and Corporate Democracy, 23 GA. L. REv. 97, 104-05 (1988-89).
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